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THE QUEEN V. DRYBONES:
The Supreme Court of Canada and
The Canadian Bill of Rights.
J. GRANT SINCLAIR
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of The
Queen v. Drybonest has been hailed by many as one of the most significant
decisions of that court in the history of Canadian constitutional law. On its
facts, the Drybones case had a rather inauspicious beginning. On April 8th,
1967, Joseph Drybones was found intoxicated in the lobby of the Old Stope
Hotel at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories. He was charged and
convicted for being an Indian, who was intoxicated off a reserve, contrary to
s. 94 (b) of the Indian Act.2 Section 94 provides:
An Indian who
(a) has intoxicants in his possession,
(b) is intoxicated, or
(c) makes or manufactures intoxicants off a reserve, is guilty of an
offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less
than ten dollars and not more than fifty dollars or to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding three months or to both fine and
imprisonment.
At the time Drybones was charged, there was in effect in the Northwest
Territories, the Liquor Ordinance3 which made it an offence for any one to be
intoxicated in a public place. Under s. 19 (1) of the Ordinance, there is no
minimum fine provided, and the maximum term of imprisonment is 30 days.
A further distinction between these two laws arises from the particular fact
that there are no Indian reserves in the Northwest Territories. Hence an
Indian, who was found intoxicated in his own home, would be subject to
prosecution, whereas similar conduct by a non-Indian would not make him
liable to punishment.
Drybones successfully appealed his conviction, and on appeal by the
Crown to the Supreme Court of Canada,4 a majority of that court held s. 94
(b) inoperative because it denied, on account of race, the right of the
individual to equality before the law, contrary to the Canadian Bill of Rights.5
The significance of the Drybones case depends on the conclusion that the
Canadian Bill of Rights is now to be applied, and should be applied, by the
*J. Grant Sinclair, B.Comm., LL.B., LL.M., Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall
Law School of York University.
1[1970] S.C.R. 282; (1970), 71 W.W.R. 171.
2 R.S.C. 1952, c. 149.
3 R.O.N.W.T. 1956, c. 60.
4 On appeal from (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 260 (N.W.T. C.A.), affg. (1967), 60
W.W.R. 321 (N.W.T. Terr. Ct.).
5 S.C. 1960, c. 44.
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courts as a law capable of imposing restraints on legislative and administrative
action which infringes any of its guarantees. The purpose of this article is to
consider the validity of this conclusion.
I
A Bill of Rights does two things. First, it designates those fundamental
rights and freedoms which are to be protected. Secondly, it guarantees their
protection by imposing obligations on some institution or person to act so
as not to abridge these protected liberties. The Canadian Bill of Rights is a
unique example of the essential model of a Bill of Rights. The guaranteed
rights and freedoms are set out in s. 1 and s. 2 of the Bill. Section 1 provides:
It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and
shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin,
colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms,
namely:
a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment
of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of
law;
b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the
law;
c) freedom of religion;
d) freedom of speech;
e) freedom of assembly and association; and
f) freedom of the press.
Under the latter part of s. 2:
... no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to:
a) authorize or effect the arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile of any
person;
b) impose or authorize the imposition of cruel and unusual treatment or punish-
ment;
c) deprive a person who has been arrested or detained
i) of the right to be informed promptly of the reason for his arrest or
detention,
ii) of the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay, or
iii) of the remedy by way of habeas corpus for the determination of the
validity of his detention and for his release if the detention is not lawful;
d) authorize a court, tribunal, commission, board or other authority to compel a
person to give evidence if he is denied counsel, protection against self crimina-
tion or other constitutional safeguards;
e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations;
f) deprive a person charged with a criminal offence of the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, or of the right to reasonable bail withoutjust cause; or
g) deprive a person of the right to the assistance of an interpreter in any pro-
ceedings in which he is involved or in which he is a party or a witness, before
a court, commission, board or other tribunal, if he does not understand or speak
the language in which such proceedings are conducted."
The main directive of the Bill is found in the opening clause of s. 2:
Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the
Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of
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Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to
authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or
freedoms herein recognized and declared...
For the purposes of s. 2, a "law of Canada" is defined by s. 5 (2) as
"an Act of the Parliament of Canada enacted before or after the coming into
force of this Act, any order, rule or regulation thereunder, and any law in
force in Canada or in any part of Canada at the commencement of this Act
that is subject to be repealed, abolished or altered by the Parliament of
Canada".
In the years following the enactment of the Bill of Rights its direct impact
on federal legislation was negligible. This can be attributed, in large part, to
the uncertainty created by the language of Sections 1 and 2, particularly the
directive contained within the opening words of the latter section. The
central question wih respect to s. 2 is how are the words construed and applied
to be read? If given a conjunctive interpretation, the result would be that the
Bill of Rights is simply a rule of construction for federal statutes and could
not have an overriding effect on inconsistent legislation. 7. That is, s. 2 requires
the courts to construe legislation in light of the guarantees of the Bill and
apply the statute as interpreted. A law which could not be construed in
conformity with the Bill was, nonetheless, to be applied according to its terms.
The Bill of Rights, then, could have meaningful effect only when the provisions
of the law were ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning. Alter-
natively, it could be argued that the formula in s. 2 means that no law of
Canada is to be construed or applied so as to infringe any of the protected
rights and freedoms. If the language of a statute is capable of two construc-
tions, one which infringes the Bill, and one which conforms to the Bill, the
latter interpretation is to be preferred. Where, however, a statute cannot be
construed to avoid a conflict with any provision of the Bill of Rights, it is not
to be applied, and is inoperative to the extent of the conflict. Thus, the
Canadian Bill of Rights would override inconsistent legislation and would
accomplish a pro tanto amendment or repeal of the legislation.8
That the Canadian Bill of Rights was to have this effect was the under-
standing of Prime Minister Diefenbaker, the person most responsible for the
Canadian Bill of Rights. In moving second reading in Parliament he stated:
. . . If any of these several rights should be violated under legislation now
existing the courts in interpreting the particular laws or statutes which have been
passed will hereafter, if this bill is passed, [the Canadian Bill of Rights] be
required to interpret those statutes of today in the light of the fact that wherever
there is a violation of any of these declarations or freedoms the statute in question
is to that extent non-operative and was never intended to be operative.9
Although legislative debates do not govern the interpretation of a particular
statute, I would argue in the case of the Bill of Rights that the expectation of
6 See also s. 3 of the Bill of Rights.
7
-See Laskin, Canada's Bill of Rights: A Dilemma for the Courts? (1962), 11
I.C.L.Q. 519; cf. Bruton, The Canadian Bill of Rights: Some American Observa-
tions, (1961-62), 8 McGill L.J. 106.
8 At least until the Bill is expressly repealed or amended, or made subject to such
legislation through the application of the notwithstanding clause of s. 2.
9 Hansard, 1960, 5646.
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Mr. Diefenbaker is supported by the wording of s. 2. If the words "construed
and applied" are considered together with the "notwithstanding clause" the
conclusion must be that the Bill of Rights is more than an aid for the
interperation of federal statutes whose meaning is vague or unclear. If a
clearly expressed, but inconsistent law, prevailed over the Bill, the necessity
to use the non-obstante clause would never arise.
The difficulty with this conclusion is that the Canadian Bill of Rights is
an ordinary statute of the Parliament of Canada, subject to amendment or
repeal at any time. On what basis can it be argued that the Bill is to be
applied as a law superior to any other enactment of Parliament? One answer
to this question is to regard s. 2 as suspending the ordinary rules of statutory
interpretation. Normally, where two federal laws conflict, the later, inconsistent
statute repeals or amends the earlier one to the extent of the repugnancy; or the
earlier, specific enactment prevails over the later, general one. What Parlia-
ment has done, in enacting s. 2, is to provide a special rule giving the Bill
priority in the case of a conflict, unless the law contains an express declaration
that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights.
This was the effect attributed to s. 2 by Mr. Elmer Driedger, the Chief
Parliamentary Draftsman and one who, it may be assumed, had a great deal
to do with the drafting of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Referring specifically
to the opening clause of section 2, he said:
This provision is clearly a rule of interpretation. Granted that Parliament cannot
bind itself and cannot bind future parliaments, it may nevertheless lay down the
rules that are to govern the interpretation and application of its own statutes. The
Interpretation Act is a long-standing example of this technique. The Bill of
Rights applies to "every law of Canada", which is defined in subsection 2 of s. 5.
The rule of interpretation prescribed by s. 2 is to apply to all laws of Canada,
unless it is expressly declared by an act of the Parliament of Canada that any of
those laws shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights. The effect
of this provision therefore would appear to be to abrogate the two rules of
inconsistency, namely, that a particular statute overrides a general statute and
that a later statute overrides an earlier one. Is such a provision effective? Parlia-
ment has not said that its own powers are any the less, nor that a future parliament
must not enact a conflicting law. Parliament has said only that certain intentions
shall not be imputed to it unless a special form of words is used. This does not
differ from s. 16 of the Interpretation Act, which says that no provision or enact-
ment in any act affects, in any manner whatsoever, the rights of Her Majesty,
unless it is expressly stated therein that Her Majesty is bound thereby, and that Act
also states that it applies to every act "now or hereafter passed".10
The virtue of this position is that it gives paramount effect to the Bill of
Rights without running afoul of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty
that no parliament can bind a future parliament.
I cannot agree, however, that s. 2 does no more than establish a rule for
the interpretation and application of federal statutes. For it is directed not
only to the courts, but also to Parliament itself, and prescribes, if not the
manner, then the form in which legislation must be expressed if it is to over-
ride the Bill. Granted, as Mr. Driedger points out, a future parliament is not
precluded from enacting a conflicting law. But if the conflicting law is to
10 The Canadian Bill of Rights, in Contemporary Problems of Public Law in Canada,
ed. by 0. E. Lang (1968) 37
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prevail over the Bill of Rights, it must contain the express declaration of s. 2.
No longer can a future parliament modify or repeal, by implication, any of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights even though such legislation is expressed in
clear, unequivocal terms. To this extent, the powers of a future parliament
are less. I agree that s. 16 of the Interpretation Act" is similar in terms to
s. 2 of the Bill in that both can be characterized as "manner and form
legislation", but the fact that Parliament enacted s. 16 is no argument that
this section or s. 2 is effective. To offer s. 16 in support of this interpretation
of s. 2, begs the question of whether either of these two instances of "manner
and form" legislation is effective in Canada. If it is, the Canadian Bill of
Rights, though an ordinary statute, could be considered practically
entrenched. 12
The proscription against "manner and form" legislation derives from
Dicey's principle of parliamentary sovereignty which most Canadian lawyers
accept as being equally part of Canadian constitutional law. According to
Dicey,
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this,
namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution, the right
to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is
recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the
legislation of Parliament.13
The characteristics of parliamentary sovereignty as it existed in England
were defined by Dicey as follows:
First, the power of the legislature to alter any law, fundamental or otherwise, as
freely and in the same manner as other laws; secondly, the absence of any legal
distinction between constitutional and other laws; thirdly, the non-existence of anyjudicial or other authority having the right to nullify an Act of Parliament, or to
treat it as void and unconstitutional.14
It is clear that the Canadian Parliament has never possessed that degree
of sovereignty which Dicey would attribute to the United Kingdom Parliament.
The Parliament of Canada is subject to a fundamental law, the British North
America Act,15 which is beyond its power to repeal. Even with respect to
ordinary laws, its substantive legislative jurisdiction is limited by the distribu-
tion of powers in s. 91 and s. 92, of that Act. Finally, the courts in Canada
always have considered it to be their proper function to review the exercise
of legislative power by Parliament and declare ultra vires any laws which fall
outside its competence.
Nor is Parliament supreme in the sense that it is free from "manner and
form" requirements. There are various requirements imposed under the
British North America Act which must be followed if legislation passed by
1 S.C. 1967, c. 7.
12 1 use the word "practically" as opposed to "legally" because Parliament could
expressly amend or repeal the Bill by simple majority. As a political matter, how-
ever, this would be a very difficult step to take.
13 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. by E. C.
S. Wade (1960) 39.
14 Ibid, p. 91 .
15 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3, as am.
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Parliament is to be valid.16 The clearest example is to be found in s. 91 (1)
which, among other things, empowers Parliament, in time of real or appre-
hended war, invasion or insurrection, to legislate for the continuance of a
House of Commons beyond the stipulated five year period, provided that
"such continuation is not opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the
members of such house".
That Parliament has only a limited sovereignty should not be a difficult
proposition to accept. For the preamble to the British North America Act, as
well as stating a desire to have "a constitution similar in principle to that of
the United Kingdom", also states the desire to be "federally united".
Federalism necessarily implies the supremacy of the constitution not the
supremacy of Parliament. Although the phrase, limited sovereignty, appears
to be a contradiction, what is meant is that the Parliament of Canada is
supreme within its own sphere. So long as it conforms to the fundamental
law, it has the power to make any law whatever, including a law which
imposes limitations upon its own powers. Such a law would in no way offend
Dicey's principle of legislative supremacy which assumes a Parliament
possessed of unlimited powers. 17 Thus, there is no reason why, until expressly
repealed or amended, the Canadian Bill of Rights should not prevail over any
inconsistent, federal legislation which does not contain the notwithstanding
clause.
Turning now to a consideration of the leading cases on the Bill of Rights,
it may be said that the courts have shown little appreciation of the con-
stitutional and interpretative problems posed by the wording of s. 2. In R. v.
Gonzales,18 the accused, an Indian, was charged and convicted for unlawful
possession of intoxicants, off a reserve, contrary to s. 94 (a) of the Indian
Act. On appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the main submission
of the appellant was that s. 94 (a) was inoperative because it denied the right
of Indians to equality before the law contrary to the Canadian Bill of Rights.
Two members of the court, Tysoe J.A. (Bird l.A. concurring), found no
conflict between the two pieces of legislation, and dismissed the appeal on
that basis. The third judge, Davey l.A., assumed, for the purpose of his
judgment, that s. 94 (a) infringed the Bill of Rights and addressed himself
solely to the question of the consequences of such a conflict. In his opinion,
it was necessary, first of all, to distinguish between subordinate legislation
and enactments of Parliament. He suggested that the effect of the Bill may
well be to nullify subordinate legislation which infringed its provisions. He
further suggested that the Bill may have the same effect on legislation of
Parliament which infringed any of the enumerated rights in s. 2.
16 See for example, sections 20, 35, 48, 50, 53 and 54.
17 Dicey's theory of parliamentary sovereignty has been challenged both by eminent
constitutional lawyers and high judicial authority. For a discussion of these
authorities, see Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights (1966) 66-89.
1s (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 290 (B.C.C.A.).
[VOL. 8, No. 3
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Insofar as the specific matters that follow this part of s. 2 [i.e. the opening clause
of section 2] are concerned, it may be that the effect is to nullify existing legislation
to the extent that it purports to authorize any of the specifically prohibited things.
But since none of those things are involved in this appeal, it is unnecessary to
express any final opinion on that point and I refrain from doing so. 19
With respect to the s. 1 rights and freedoms, s. 2 was nothing more than
a rule of construction.
Insofar as existing legislation does not offend any of the matters specifically
mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) of s. 2, but is said to otherwise infringe upon
some of the human rights and fundamental freedoms declared in s. 1, in my
opinion the section does not repeal such legislation either expressly or by
implication. On the contrary, it expressly recognizes the continued existence of
such legislation, but provides that it shall be construed and applied so as not toderogate from those rights and freedoms. By that, it seems merely to provide
a canon or rule of interpretation for such legislation. The very language of s. 2,
"be so construed and applied as not to abrogate" assumes that the prior Act may be
sensibly construed and applied in a way that will avoid derogating from the rights
and freedoms declared in s. 1. If the prior legislation cannot be so construed and
applied sensibly, then the effect of s. 2 is exhausted, and the prior legislation must
prevail according to its plain meaning. 20
Presumably, the distinction drawn by Davey J.A. is based on the words
in which the formula in s. 2 is expressed. The phrase "construed and applied"
is used with reference to the rights and freedoms declared in s. 1; whereas,
a disjunctive form "construed or applied" is used in relation to the fights
enumerated in s. 2. It is interesting that Davey J.A. reached his decision
through a close analysis of the specific wording of s. 2, yet ignored completely
the notwithstanding clause. One can only speculate as to the reasons for this.
Perhaps he considered it made no difference to the result of his reasoning; or it
may be that he was not prepared to accept the responsibility of overriding
Parliament by declaring invalid legislation which was otherwise within its
legislative competence.
In contrast, is the dissenting judgment of Cartwright I. in Robertson and
Rosetanni v. The Queen.21 The issue in the Robertson case was whether the
Lord's Day Act 22 infringed freedom of religion as guaranteed by section 1 (c)
of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Section 4 of the Lord's Day Act provides as
follows:
It shall not be lawful for any person on the Lord's Day, except as provided herein,
or in any provincial Act or law now or hereafter in force, to sell or offer for sale
or purchase any goods, chattels or other personal property, or any real estate, or
to carry on or transact any business of his ordinary calling ,or in connection with
such calling, or for gain to do, or employ any other person to do, on that day, any
work, business or labour.
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada avoided the interpretative
problem of s. 2 by finding no inconsistency between the Act and the Bill of
Rights.23 Mr. Justice Cartwright dissented from this conclusion. In his opinion,
the purpose and effect of the Act was to compel the observance of Sunday as a
religious holy day, and "any law which compels a course of conduct, whether
19 Ibid, pp. 291-2.
2o Ibid, p. 292.
21 [1963] S.C.R. 651.
2?R.S.C. 1952, c. 171.
23 This judgment is discussed later in this article.
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positive or negative, for a purely religious purpose infringes the freedom of
religion." 24 Dealing next with the consequences of this conclusion, he
referred to the reasoning of Davey J.A. in the Gonzales case and stated:
With the greatest respect I find myself unable to agree with this view. The
imperative words of s. 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights ..... appear to me to
require the courts to refuse to apply any law, coming within the legislative authority
of Parliament, which infringes freedom of religion unless it is expressly declared
by an Act of Parliament that the law which does so infringe shall operate
notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights... In my opinion, where there is an
irreconcilable conflict between another Act of Parliament and the Canadian Bill
of Rights the latter must prevail.25
There can be no argument that Cartwright, J. provided a very clear
statement as to the effect to be given to s. 2 of the Bill. What is lacking are
any substantial reasons in support of his conclusion. However, his judgment
did serve to isolate the alternatives that were available'to the Supreme Court
in the Drybones case, and it is within the context of these two earlier decisions
that the reasoning of Ritchie J., on behalf of the majority, must be considered.
Referring expressly to the statement of Davey, J.A. in the Gonzales case,26
Ritchie J. rejected it because "this proposition appears to me to strike at the
very foundations of the Bill of Rights and to convert it from its apparent
character as a statutory declaration of the fundamental human rights and
freedoms which it recognizes, into being little more than a rule for the
construction of federal statutes .... ,"27 Rather, he agreed that the proper
characterization of the effect of the Bill was as stated by Cartwright J. in his
dissent in the Robertson case.
If Mr. Justice Davey's reasoning was correct and the Bill of Rights was to be
construed as meaning that all laws of Canada which clearly offend the Bill were to
operate notwithstanding its provisions, then the words which I have italicized in s.
2 [the notwithstanding clause] would be superfluous unless it be suggested that
Parliament intended to reserve unto itself the right to exclude from the effect of
the Bill of Rights only such statutes as are unclear in their meaning.
It seems to me that a more realistic meaning must be given to the words in
question and they afford, in my view, the clearest indication that s. 2 is intended
to mean and does mean that if a law of Canada cannot be "sensibly construed and
applied" so that it does not abrogate, abridge or infringe one of the rights and
freedoms recognized and declared by the Bill, then such law is inoperative "unless
it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate
notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights.28
According to the majority, it can no longer be contended that s. 2
provides only a rule of construction. But, by focusing on the notwithstanding
clause of s. 2, is Ritchie J. to be taken as suggesting that it is a special rule of
priority for resolving conflicts between the Bill and other federal legislation?
If so, has Ritchie J. impliedly rejected the proposition that the Bill of Rights
enacts a "manner and form" requirement for all federal laws? Or has he
decided that this kind of legislation is effective in Canada? It must be
remembered that s. 94 (b) of the Indian Act is legislation which was in
existence at the time of the enactment of the Bill of Rights. Therefore, it is
24 [1963] S.C.R. 651, 660.
2 Ibld, p. 662.
26 Supra, footnote 20.
27 [1970] S.C.R. 282, 293.
28 lbid, p. 294.
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possible to regard the majority reasoning as the straight application of the
ordinary rule that, in the case of a conflict between two statutes, the later
law prevails over the earlier one. If this is all that was decided, the question
still remains as to the effect of the Bill on subsequent, inconsistent legislation.
Such a conclusion, however, would run counter to the wording of s. 5 (2),
which makes it plain that the Bill is to have the same effect on all laws,
whether passed prior or subsequent to it. Thus, I 'would suggest that the
majority judgment must be read as either characterizing the s. 2 as a special
rule of priority or as "manner and form" legislation. The problem with the
former, as I contended earlier, is that it does not accord with the wording
of s. 2. More to the point, suppose Parliament enacted a subsequent, sub-
stantive law which was clearly inconsistent with the Bill, but did not contain
the non obstante clause. Would our courts hold this law ineffective because
of a provision in an earlier law laying down a rule of priority? It would
seem that the court could better justify its refusal to apply the law if s. 2
was interpreted as a "manner and form" requirement, for it could declare the
attempt by Parliament to amend the Bill of Rights as invalid for failure to
follow the prescribed manner and form.
m
So far, my discussion has been limited to a consideration of the logical
and analytical problems raised by the Canadian Bill of Rights. These are the
terms in which the debate is usually conducted within the Canadian legal
environment. I now want to focus on the equally important problem of the
implications of the Drybones decision with respect to the vital question of
institutional policy.29 This case has achieved an effective transfer of power
from the legislature to the courts. While the courts of Canada have always
exercised supervision over Parliament, there is an important distinction
between their traditional function of judicial review and their new role under
the Bill of Rights. Previously, lack of legislative jurisdiction in a federal
sense was the only basis for invalidating legislation.30 Now the courts are
to declare inoperative legislation which is otherwise valid if they disagree
with the values or policy implemented by specific legislation. In other words,
it is the judiciary, not Parliament who, to a very great extent, will be respon-
sible for determining the content and scope of fundamental liberties in
Canada.
This certainly was a concern of Mr. Justice Cartwright, who in dissenting
in the Drybones case, completely reversed the position he had taken earlier in
Robertson:
The question is whether or not it is the intention of Parliament to confer the
power and impose the responsibility upon the courts of declaring inoperative any
provision in a Statute of Canada although expressed in clear and unequivocal
terms, the meaning of which after calling in aid every rule of construction including
29 See Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, (1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev.
406.
80 Union Colliery v. Bryden, 11899] A.C. 580, 585 per Lord Watson.
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that prescribed by s. 2 of the Bill is perfectly plain, if in the view of the court
it infringes any of the rights or freedoms declared by s. I of the Bill.
In approaching this question, it must not be forgotten that the responsibility
mentioned above, if imposed at all, is imposed upon every justice of the peace,
magistrate and judge of any court in the country who is called upon to apply a
Statute of Canada or any order, rule or regulation made thereunder.31
In my opinion, the apprehension expressed by Cartwright J. is well
founded. The courts in Canada have had little experience in interpreting and
applying constitutional guarantees of the traditional freedoms. This, in itself,
is not an overriding consideration because the courts, in their ordinary
activities, are constantly involved in the interpretation of statutes and the
common law. More important is the judicial philosophy of a court and the
way in which it conceives of its role and its relationship to the legislature.
The predominant philosophy of the Canadian courts is that of positivism. The
courts, our judges would argue, are not properly a law making body. Indeed,
they perceive of themselves as insulated from those social, political and
economic considerations which are the raw materials of the law maker. The
validity of this self-perception is problematic, yet our courts strive to maintain
this positivist posture. But the Bill of Rights implicitly demands that the
courts be prepared to abandon mechanical jurisprudence. Although expressed
in unqualified terms, it cannot be that the guaranteed rights and freedoms
are to be interpreted as absolutes. Adjudication in this area necessarily
involves a judicial balancing of claims to exercise any of the guarantees
against considerations of public order and the expectations of the community.
Contemporary social facts as well as the facts which give rise to the
controversy thus become all important to intelligent decision-making. I
wonder, however, whether it is realistic, or fair, to expect the judiciary to
abandon their positivist attitude and accept the consequential role of com-
munity policy makers. Certainly their legal training, founded as it is in the
traditions of positivism, and their professional experience militates against
this. Further, the superior courts of Canada exercise a mixed private and
public law jurisdiction which tends to inhibit the development of the kind of
expertise and perspective which is so necessary to statesman-like decisions.
A further consideration is the method by which constitutional issues
are argued. Material facts for decision are presented to the court on the
basis of the record and through submissions of counsel on behalf of the
litigants. Apart from the doctrine of judicial notice, and the personal
knowledge of the judges there is little opportunity to apprise the court of
the relevant social facts. It has been suggested by some commentators3 2 that
the use of the Brandeis Brief would be a useful method for accomplishing
this. As a technical matter, there is some difficulty in implementing this
suggestion, at least in the Supreme Court of Canada. Under the Rules of that
31 f1970] S.C.R. 282, 287-8. It should be noted that this was not the sole basis of
Cartwright J.'s dissent. He considered his opinion in the Robertson case to be
erroneous because it required the courts to refuse to apply any inconsistent law
whereas the wording of s. 2 of the Bill of Rights required the courts to apply such
laws.
32 See McWhinney, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law in Canada, in Canadian
Jurisprudence. The Civil Law and Common Law in Canada (1958) 16.
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Court,33 the parties to an appeal are required to submit factums containing a
concise statement of the facts of the case and "a brief of the argument
setting out the points of law or fact to be discussed. While the word "fact"
seems broad enough to accommodate something in the nature of a Brandeis
Brief, the little judicial authority on the point supports the opposite con-
clusion.34 Even if the Brandeis Brief was an accepted part of Canadian
constitutional adjudication, the task of the courts would not be any easier.
This technical device may be regarded as providing, at the appeal level, the
kind of expert evidence that is available to the lower courts. The appeal
court must still decide whether or not to accept such evidence and how much
weight it is to be given. In short, the Brandeis Brief must be seen for what it
is, as an aid for the resolution of facts which are in dispute and not as a
substitute for decision making.35 The court still must determine whether or
not to give judicial protection, in a particular case, to the purported exercise
of any of the constitutionally recognized rights and freedoms.
While the technical attitudes of the judiciary, and the sophistication of
fact-finding techniques are vital considerations with respect to the question
of institutional policy, equally important is the willingness of the judges to
engage in an in-depth analysis of the issues confronting the court. The record
of our courts, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada, is not one which
inspires a great deal of confidence in their ability to deal with the admittedly
difficult definitional problems raised by s. 1 of the Bill of Rights. No better
illustration of this statement can be found than in the two cases which have
reached the Supreme Court of Canada on a Bill of Rights issue, Robertson
and Rosetanni v. The Queen,36 and The Queen v. Drybones.3 7 The issue in
Robertson was whether the Lord's Day Act infringed the guarantee of freedom
3 3 Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, 1945, as am., Rules 29 and 30. It should
be noted that these two Rules have been amended by General Order of the Supreme
Court of Canada, October 28, 1970. Quaere, whether these amendments which are
to take effect on February 1, 1971, will be interpreted so as to permit the use of
a device such as the Brandeis Brief.
84 See Saumur v. The City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, 325. On the question of
costs to be awarded to the successful appellant, Kerwin J. said: "The appeal should
be allowed and a declaration and injunction granted in the terms set out above.
Although he does not secure all that he claims, the appellant is entitled to his
costs of the action and of the appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side).
He is also entitled to his cost of the present appeal except that nothing should be
allowed for the preparation of a factum. Rule 30 of the Rules of this Court pro-
vides for, the contents of the factum or points of argument of each party, Part 3
whereof is to consist of "a brief of the argument setting out the points of law
or fact to be discussed". This Rule was not complied with by the appellant filing
two volumes containing 912 mimeographed pages together with an appendix
thereto of 86 mimeographed pages".
85 A good example of what I mean is the case of Brown v. Board of Education,
(1954), 347 U.S. 438. The question for the court was whether racial segregation
in the schools deprived black children of "the equal protection" of the law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In
deciding this issue, the court had to reassess the validity of the "separate but
equal doctrine" which was a question of fact. It was with respect to this question
that evidence as to the social and psychological impact of racial segregation was
offered.
86 [1963] S.C.R. 651.
37 [1970] S.C.R. 282.
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of religion as found in s. 1 (c) of the Bill of Rights. The Lord's Day Act was
first passed by the Parliament of Canada in 1906. As is evident from its title,
its purpose was to preserve the sanctity of Sunday, the sabbath for the
majority of the Canadian population.38 At the time the Robertson case arose,
the practice of the Attorney General of Ontario was to enforce the Act by
way of selective prosecution, reasoning that the Act was a social measure to
control the level of Sunday commercialism. If the Supreme Court of Canada
were to hold the Lord's Day Act inoperative as denying freedom of religion,
the consequences would extend far beyond the interests of the particular
litigants. It would cause significant dislocation in the established economic
and social practices that had developed within the community. On the other
hand, a refusal on the part of the Court to find a conflict would be tantamount
to a judicial sanctioning of the imposition of one aspect of Christianity on a
significant minority in Canada who do not accept the sanctity of Sunday as
one of the tenets of their religion. Perhaps, the best solution would have been
for the Supreme Court to refuse to hear the appeal and thereby implicitly
recognize the issue as a non-justiciable one.
Turning now to the actual reasoning,39 the majority judgment was
delivered by Mr. Justice Ritchie. In his opinion, it was first of all necessary
to attempt a definition of the phrase "freedom of religion". One starting
point is suggested by the Bill of Rights itself. By s. 1, it is recognized and
declared that in Canada "there have existed and shall continue to exist...
the following human rights and freedoms, namely... (c) freedom of religion".
On the basis of this section, it is possible to contend that laws in existence
at the time of the enactment of the Bill supply the definition of the enumerated
freedoms. Therefore, there could never be a conflict between an existing
law and the Bill of Rights. This was the interpretation given to s. 1 by
Pigeon J., dissenting, in the Drybones case.
In considering the provisions just quoted, Es. 1 of the Bill], one must observe that
the Bill itself begins by a solemn declaration by Parliament in the form of an
enactment that, in Canada, the enumerated rights and freedoms "have existed and
shall continue to exist. . . .". This statement is the essential element of the very
first provision of the Bill and it is absolutely unqualified. It is the starting point of
that legislation and I have great difficulty in reconciling it with the contention
that in fact those rights and freedoms were not wholly and completely existing
but were restricted by any number of statutory and other provisions infringing
thereon.
There can be no doubt that in enacting legislation Parliament is presumed to be
aware of the state of the law .... A fortiori must it be so when the enactment
itself has reference thereto. Where is the extent of existing human rights and
fundamental freedoms to be ascertained if not by reference to the statute books
and other legislative instruments as well as to the decisions of the courts?
It must also be considered that the rights and freedoms enumerated in s. 1 are
not legal concepts of precise and invariable content. If those words were to be
88 It should be noted that the Lord's Day Act does not impose an absolute prohibition
on commercial activities on Sunday. Under s. 4, any province may legislate so as
to exempt certain activities from the application of the Act. Many provinces have
enacted their own Lord's Day legislation. See for example, The Lord's Day Act(Ontario), S.O. 1960-1, c. 50 as am.
39 The case has been discussed in Laskin, Freedom of Religion and the Lord's Day
Act - The Canadian Bill of Rights and the Sunday Bowling Case, (1964), 42
Can. Bar Rev. 147; and in, Godfrey, Freedom of Religion and the Canadian Bill
of Rights, (1964), 22 U. of Tor. Fac. of Law R. 60.
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taken by themselves, a great deal would be left undefined. However, by declaring
those rights and freedoms as they existed a large measure of precision was
supplied. Is this not an important purpose of s. 1 and a very effective way of
defining some key words of the enactment?...
... . If in s. 1 the act means what it says and recognizes and declares existing
rights and freedoms only, nothing more than proper construction of existing laws
in accordance with the Bill is required to accomplish the intended result. There
can never be any necessity for declaring any of them inoperative as coming in
conflict with the rights and freedoms defined in the Bill seeing that these are
declared as existing in them... .40
It is not clear from his reasoning exactly what position Ritchie J. took.
First of all, he stated that
... The Canadian Bill of Rights is not concerned with "human rights and funda-
mental freedoms" in any abstract sense, but rather with such "rights and freedoms"
as they existed in Canada immediately before the statute was enacted. It is
therefore the "religious freedom" then existing in this country that is safeguarded
by the provisions of s. 2 ...
It is accordingly of first importance to understand the concept of religious freedom
which was recognized in this country before the enactment of the Canadian Bill of
Rights and after the enactment of the Lord's Day Act in its present form..." 41
Ritchie J. also said that freedom of religion was "recognized by this
Court as existing in Canada before the Canadian Bill of Rights and notwith-
standing the provisions of the Lord's Day Act" 42
It could be contended that Ritchie J. meant that freedom of religion
was to be defined by laws which were in existence at the time of the enactment
of the Bill. That would have been sufficient to dispose of the appeal since
freedom of religion must be regarded as subject to aid circumscribed by the
Lord's Day Act. But Ritchie J. did not end his judgment at this point. He
went on to consider whether or not the Lord's Day Act, in fact, conflicted with
the Bill. In so doing, again it is unclear whether he intended merely to provide
an alternative basis for his conclusion, or he considered that existing laws
may not always be compatible with the guarantees of the Bill. In any event,
the above contention was expressly rejected by Ritchie J. in Drybones:
If it had been accepted that the right to "freedom of religion" as declared in the
Bill of Rights was circumscribed by the provisions of the Canadian statutes in
force at the date of its enactment, there would have been no need, in determining
the validity of the Lord's Day Act to consider the authorities in order to examine
the situation in light of the concept of religious freedom which was recognized in
Canada at the time of the enactment of the Bill of Rights. It would have been
enough to say that "freedom of religion" as used in the Bill must mean freedom
of religion subject to the provisions of the Lord's Day Act. This construction
would, however, have run contrary to the provision of s. 5 (2) of the Bill which
makes it applicable to every "Act of the Parliament of Canada enacted before or
after the coming into force of this Act.43
It is with respect to the question of the conflict between the Lord's Day
Act and the Bill that the inadequacy of analysis of the majority in the Robert-
son case really becomes apparent. First of all, Ritchie J. adopted as his
operational definition of freedom of religion, the statement of Mr. Justice
40 [1970] S.C.R. 282, 302-304.
41 [1963] S.C.R. 651, 654-5.
42 Ibid, p. 655.
43 [1970] S.C.R. 282, 296.
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Frankfurter, dissenting, in Board of Education v. Barnett44 that "its essence
is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity
to law because of religious dogma". He then proceeded to enquire as to
whether or not the Lord's Day Act fell within or outside of this definition:
My own view is that the effect of the Lord's Day Act rather than its purpose must
be looked to in order to determine whether its application involves the abrogation,
abridgement or infringement of religious freedom, and I can see nothing in that
statute which in any way affects the liberty of religious thought and practice of any
citizen of this country. Nor is the "untrammelled affirmations of religious belief
and its propogation" in any way curtailed.
The practical result of this law on those whose religion requires them to observe
a day of rest other than Sunday, is a purely secular and financial one in that they
are required to refrain from carrying on or conducting their business on Sunday
as well as on their own day of rest. In some cases this is no doubt a business
inconvenience, but it is neither an abrogation nor an abridgement nor an infringe-
ment of religious freedom, and the fact that it has been brought about by reason
of the existence of a statute enacted for the purpose of preserving the sanctity of
Sunday cannot, in my view, be construed as attaching some religious significance
to an effect which is purely secular in so far as non-Christians are concerned.45
The finding of the majority of no conflict between the Lord's Day Act
and the Bill has considerable implications both for religious freedom in Canada
and the whole process of constitutional interpretation. As Ritchie J. himself
recognized, 46 the power to legislate for purely secular purposes, such as the
regulation of hours of labour or business closing times, is within the exclusive
legislative jurisdiction of the provinces. On the other hand, Lord's Day
legislation has been consistently upheld as having a religious character, and
as such, comes within the criminal law power of Parliament.47 If the Lord's
Day Act is now to be considered as having a non-religious character, its
constitutional support falls. This result can be avoided only if one is prepared
to accept the rather novel argument advanced by Ritchie J., completely without
reasons, that the constitutional test of "purpose and effect" is to be applied in
determining legislative jurisdiction, but, only the "effect" of legislation is to
be considered for Bill of Rights purposes. 48
In terms of religious freedom in Canada, by upholding the Lord's Day
Act, the Supreme Court of Canada has implicitly recognized that s. 1 (c)
of the Bill of Rights protects only the free exercise of religion and does not
include a ban on state action which prefers one religion over another.
Admittedly, the question of whether or not the Bill of Rights should be
interpreted as including a guarantee against the establi§hment of religion
is a very difficult one to answer. But, it is a rather telling fact that the
majority of the Supreme Court, once having raised the question of the
content and scope of religious freedom, were not prepared to go any further
than adopt a brief statement culled from a dissenting judgment which involved
a constitutional guarantee expressed in very different language than s. 1 (c)
44 (1943), 319 U.S. 624, 653.
4 [1963] S.C.R. 651, 657-8.
46 bid, pp. 656-7.
47 See Henry Birk & Sons (Montreal) Ltd. v. Montreal and A.G. Quebec, [1955]
S.C.R. 799.
48For an elaboration of this point, see Laskin, op.cit., p. 155; and Godfrey, op.cit.,
pp. 72-3.
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of the Canadian Bill of Rights.49 Indeed, this statement by Frankfurter J.
barely expressed his judicial philosophy with respect to religious freedom.50
In fairness, it is not reasonable to expect a highly sophisticated Bill of
Rights jurisprudence to emerge on the basis of one decision. This is especially
true when one considers that Robertson was the first occasion upon which
the Supreme Court had to interpret a substantive provision of the Bill of
Rights. But if the Court derived any benefit from its experience in deciding
the Robertson case, it certainly was not apparent in the judgment of the
majority in Drybones. In interpreting "equality before the law", the Court
engaged in the same narrow, unreflective analysis that was so characteristic
of its approach in the earlier case. It seemed unable to move beyond
considerations of the particular interests of the parties involved and construct
an intellectual framework within which alternative definitions of equality
before the law and the implications thereof could be tested.
A convenient starting point is the interpretation given to these words
by Tysoe J.A. in the Gonzales case.51 For him, the phrase "equality before
the law" as found in s. 1 (c) of the Bill of Rights meant:
A right of every person to whom a particular law relates or extends, no matter
what may be a person's race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, to stand on
an equal footing with every other person to whom a particular law relates or
extends and the right to the protection of the law.52
Mr. Justice Ritchie, who delivered the majority judgment in Drybones,
made short shrift of this definition and rightfully so:
... I cannot agree with this interpretation pursuant to which it seems to me that
the most glaring discriminatory legislation against a racial group would have to
be construed as recognizing the right of each of its individual members to "equality
before the law", so long as all the other members are being discriminated against
in the same way.
...Without attempting any exhaustive definition of "equality before the law" I
think that s. 1 (b) means at least that no individual or group of individuals is
to be treated more harshly than another under that law, and I am therefore of the
opinion that an individual is denied equality before the law if it is made an
offence punishable at law, on account of his race, for him to do something which
his fellow Canadians are free to do without having committed any offence or having
been made subject to any penalty.53
It is precisely his failure to attempt any exhaustive definition that makes
Ritchie J.'s interpretation so unsatisfactory. It ignores the quite valid
objection raised by Pigeon J., that the conclusion of the majority amounts
to a virtual repeal of federal legislative jurisdiction over Indians. Under s. 91
(24) of the British North America Act, the Parliament of Canada is given
exclusive jurisdiction to pass laws in relation to "Indians and lands reserved
49 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution includes both a guarantee
of free exercise as well as a prohibition against the establishment of a religion.
It should also be noted, that later in his opinion, Frankfurter J. said: "the essence
of the religious freedom guaranteed by our Constitution is, therefore, this: no
religion shall either receive the state's support or incur its hostility". Board of
Education v. Barnette, (1943), 319 U.S. 624, 654.
50 See Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness (1965) 112-118.
51 (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 290.
52 Ibid, p. 296.
53 [1970] S.C.R. 282, 297.
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for Indians". As Pigeon J. pointed out, the very object of this section "is
to enable the Parliament of Canada to make legislation applicable only to
Indians as such and therefore not applicable to Canadian citizens generally". 54
But, carried to its logical conclusion, Ritchie J.'s definition of equality before
the law would preclude Parliament, not only from enacting laws which treated
Indians more harshly than other Canadians, but also from enacting laws
which conferred special benefits on Indians. Legislation of the latter kind
would deny the right of non-Indians to equality before the law. For a law
which grants benefits to Indians not given to non-Indians, "treats those latter
individuals or group of individuals more harshly than another under that law".
Notwithstanding Ritchie J.'s statements to the contrary,5 the result of the
majority reasoning, if carried to its logical conclusion, would be that the
whole of the Indian Act must now be declared inoperative. It is most unfor-
tunate that the Supreme Court of Canada, almost inadvertently, has introduced
additional complications with respect to the legislative jurisdiction of Parlia-
ment to implement new Indian policies, especially at a time when the whole
question of the status and rights of the aboriginal people in Canada is being
widely debated.
The implications of the majority decision extend far beyond the rights
of Indians and the provisions of the Indian Act. Did the majority mean to
imply that any law of Canada which classifies on the basis of race is per se
inoperative? Is the same true of all federal laws which classify on the basis
of any of the other criteria contained within the non-discrimination clause of
s. 1 of the Bill?56 In other words, can it be argued, on the Drybones case,
that Parliament, in enacting the non-discrimination clause, has declared that
any law of Canada that depends for its legislative classification on race,
national origin, colour, religion or sex, cannot stand in the face of the Bill
of Rights? If so, at least three areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction are
bound to be affected, the federal franchise, immigration and the criminal law.
Many examples can be found of existing legislation which offend s. 1 (b) of
the Bill as presently defined. To name a few, exclusion of persons other than
native-born or naturalized Canadian citizens of the right to vote in federal
elections denies equality before the law on account of national origin;57
similarly, any disabilities or obligations imposed under the Immigration Act58
must be declared inoperative for the same reason. Certain provisions of the
Criminal Code59 relating to sexual offences, such as rape and indeceit
assault male, obviously discriminate against men on the basis of sex. Another
example of discrimination on the basis of sex is s. 164 (1) (c) of the Code
which makes it an offence to be a common prostitute or nightwalker.6°
54 Ibid, p. 303.
56 bid, p. 298.
56 This seems to be the opinion of Hall I., ibid, p. 300.
6 7 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 1960, c. 39, s. 14.58 Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 325 as am.
59 S.C. 1953-4, c. 51 as am., s. 135 & s. 148.60 In fact, one recent lower court decision reached this conclusion. See R. v. Viens
(so far unreported) where Ontario Provincial Court Judge Morrison held, inter
alia, s. 164 (1) (c) inoperative as infringing equality before the law.
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While on the subject of sex, I should mention the recent Royal Commission
Report on the Status of Women in Canada.61 I would suggest that federal
legislation which seeks to implement any of the provisions of the Report
recommending special benefits for women, must be declared inoperative as
discriminating against men on the basis of sex.
Closely related to the above discussion is the question of whether the
non-discrimination clause exhausts the range of criteria by which it may be
said that any of the rights and freedoms in s. 1 are infringed. That is, are
the categories contained within the non-discrimination clause to be read as
qualifying the enumerated guarantees? When the Bill of Rights was first
introduced in the House of Commons62 these words were contained in what
is now s. 1 (b). Surely Parliament by moving these words up into the
opening clause of s. 1 so that they now qualify the word "exist", did not
intend to limit the application of the Bill to laws which infringed its guarantees
solely by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex. In the
first place, equality before the law, must itself include a ban on certain
laws which discriminate on the basis of the above categories. Secondly, it
would make little sense to assert without more, that freedom of the press,
for example, was not infringed by a federal law which imposed an absolute
prohibition on the publication of a daily newspaper anywhere in Canada even
if the admitted purpose of such a law was for reasons other than race, national
origin, etc.
The most logical interpretation of the effect of the non-discrimination
clause, and the one which best suits the context of s. 1, would be to regard
these words as ensuring that the enumerated rights and freedoms are to extend
to all persons in Canada regardless of their race, national origin, colour,
religion or sex.63 Accepting this conclusion as the proper one (or assuming
that the majority in the Drybones case did not mean to enunciate a per se
constitutional rule) it becomes crucial to develop some judicial standards or
approach by which any federal law can be assessed in terms of its com-
patibility with the requirements of "equality before the law". This is not to be
found in the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Drybones. It is
strange that the same court, and indeed, the same judge, Ritchie J., was
quite prepared to adopt American authorities in aid of the decision in Robert-
61 Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1970.
62 Bill C-79, House of Commons of Canada, 3rd Session, 24th Parliament, June 27,
1960.
63 None of the judges in the Drybones case including those in dissent, dealt explicitly
with this question. The only judicial opinion that I have found is that of Tysoe
J.A. in R. v. Gonzales, (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 290, 294. In considering the effect
of the non-discrimination clause he said: "As I read the Canadian Bill of Rights,
the human rights and fundamental freedoms enumerated in s. 1 belong to all
persons irrespective of their race, national origin, colour, religion or sex. The words
"without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex"
are not qualifying words. I am doubtful if this phrase is to be interpreted as
extending further than to emphasize that the rights and freedoms exist for all
persons no matter who they may be". See also, the statement of Justice Minister
Fulton given before the House of Commons Special Committee on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms to the effect that this clause was designed to ensure
that everyone in Canada would possess these rights without discrimination. 1960
Committee Proceedings, 380.
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son. Yet, when deciding the Drybones case, the wealth of decisions and legal
scholarship concerning the Equal Protection clause of the United States
Constitution was virtually ignored.
One doctrine suggested by the American experience is that of "reason-
able classification" 64 This theory can be summarized as follows. The ideal of
equality before the law would demand the same laws for all persons and the
application of the law equally to everyone. But to expect the attainment of this
ideal would be wholly unrealistic. For it would require that things different
in fact be treated constitutionally as if they were the same. Therefore, laws
must classify,65 and in so doing, must discriminate as against individuals or
groups of individuals. It is at this point that the idea of reasonableness
becomes relevant. Such discrimination is acceptable, as a matter of law, if the
classification upon which it is based, is itself reasonable. At the very minimum,
a reasonable classification is one which treats all persons who are similarly
situated, the same. This was the definition suggested by Tysoe J.A. in the
Gonzales case, and its inadequacy has already been commented upon earlier
in this paper.66.
There is a much better test of the reasonableness of a classification con-
tained within a law; one which seeks to accommodate the ideal of equality with
the need for legislative particularization. By this test, a reasonable classifica-
tion is one which has a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the law. That
is, the classification includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect
to the purpose of the law.67 But the guarantee of equality before the law may
not necessarily be satisfied by this requirement of reasonable classification.
There may be many situations where the classification in the law coincides
completely with the class of those persons similarly situated in terms of the
purpose of the law. Section 94 of the Indian Act is an example of such a case.
Its purpose is directed towards the protection of Indians by controlling their
use of intoxicants. This purpose is based on the legislative determination that
such use is peculiarly harmful to their individual well-being, and more broadly,
to their social and cultural practises. Since only Indians are subject to
prosecution under s. 94, the classification is perfectly reasonable. Similarly,
a law which prohibited black children from attending white schools, could not
be challenged on the basis of its classification, if its purpose was to maintain
the "purity" of the white race. If these two instances of discrimination are to
be prevented, the doctrine of reasonable classification must be further refined.
64 For an excellent article which discusses this concept, see Tussman and Tenbroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, (1949), 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341.
6s The word "classify" is used here in the sense of defining, by the designation of
certain characteristics or traits, the class of persons to which a particular law applies
rather than determining whether or not an individual is a member of that class.
6 Supra, at p. 613.
67 A good illustration of how this test could be applied is the Japanese Canadians
Case [1947] A.C. 87, in which the Privy Council upheld three Orders-in-Council
made in December 1945, authorizing the deportation of persons of "Japanese
ancestry", who had "requested" repatriation. On the above test, the reasonableness
of this classification could be challenged on the grounds that it was both under-
inclusive and over-inclusive, having regard to the purpose of the law.
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One way of accomplishing this is to say that laws which classify on the
basis of race, religion, colour, etc. offend equality before the law. In other
words, certain traits, no matter how reasonably related to the purpose of the
law, can never be made the basis of a constitutional classification. As men-
tioned earlier in this paper, this seems to be the basis of the majority reasoning
in the Drybones case. But, as was also pointed out, there are difficulties in
adopting this approach. Although it provides a rationale for invalidating the
most flagrant discriminatory laws, it also precludes laws which grant special
benefits to individuals, or groups of individuals, by reason of their race,
religion, colour, etc. Further, laws which classified in an equally invidious
fashion, but on a basis other than the constitutionally irrelevant categories,
would not be caught by this definition. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond
the mere identification of the purpose of the law, and the promulgation of
constitutional rules.
What I now suggest is that the doctrine of reasonable classification be
viewed as a requirement that the singling out of an individual or a group of
individuals for special treatment must be justified. This can only be justified
in terms of the legitimacy of the legislative purpose. The judicial task with
respect to the problem of legitimacy involves the following inquiry. First, the
court must discover the law's purpose, which may or may not be expressly
stated. Secondly, the court must decide whether or not to accept the legislative
judgment of fact underlying the purpose of the law. In this regard, it has two
choices. It may defer to the legislative judgment, reasoning that the deter-
mination of fact is a peculiarly legislative function, or it may reject the
legitimacy of purpose on the grounds that the facts upon which it is based
are not true. In so doing, the court itself must engage in the process of fact-
finding.68
Even if the court accepts the legislative determination as to the truth of
the facts, that does not necessarily end the matter. It may decide that the
purpose of the law is not legitimate in terms of the value to society in achieving
the object of the regulation measured against the costs to those who are subject
to special burdens or who are denied special benefits. In other words, while
accepting the validity of the social facts, the court may disagree with the
legislative response to those facts. In both cases where the court rejects the
purpose of the law, it is substituting its judgment for that of the legislature.
In conclusion, the guarantee of equality before the law is met if the
requirement of reasonable classification is satisfied. And a classification
within a law, which imposes special burdens or grants special benefits, is
reasonable if it is necessarily related to the achievement of a legitimate
legislative purpose.
Viewed in this way, the nature of the issue presented by the Drybones
case is sharply focused. The issue may be stated as follows. In legislating with
respect to the question of intoxication, was Parliament justified in singling out
68 By this is meant that the court must look beyond the facts which gave rise to the
dispute and inquire into the relevant social facts that bear on the issue. Thus, it can
be seen why the use of a technical device such as the Brandeis Brief is so important.
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the conduct of one class of Canadians, Indians, for different treatment?
Ignoring the prohibited category rule, the Supreme Court of Canada could
have approached the question in one of two ways. First, it could have inquired
into the reasons as to why Indians were made the subject of a special law.
In so doing, it might have ascertained that the legislative purpose of s. 94 of
the Indian Act was to protect the Indians, which purpose was based on the
fact that the dangers to the individual well-being of Indians and Indians as a
whole, from the consumption of alcohol, were much greater than for non-
Indians. If the court accepted these facts without more, then the classification
was reasonable and s. 94 did not infringe the equality before the law provision
of the Bill of Rights. On the other hand, the court might have decided, on the
basis of contemporary evidence, that the facts did not support the legislative
inference that Indians are different from the rest of Canadians at least in terms
of the effects of alcohol consumption; and therefore, must not be treated any
differently under the law.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Canada, once having determined
the purpose of the law, might have decided that the validity of the facts upon
which it was based was a matter beyond its competence to determine. But,
in deferring to the legislative diagnosis of the social problem, the court was not
necessarily bound to accept the validity of the legislative remedy. It may have
concluded that the more stringent burden imposed upon Indians was not
reasonably likely to achieve the valid legislative objective of ameliorating the
problems of Indian intoxication. Of course, this approach raises anew all of
the difficult problems of judicial review of factual determinations by a
representative legislature.
But, by making the kind of qualitative decision suggested above, the
Supreme Court of Canada could have disposed of the issue in the Drybones
case, while at the same time, reserving its right to review the other provisions
of the Indian Act and the right of Parliament to implement new Indian
policies under s. 91 (24) of the British North America Act.
IV
At the beginning of this article, I raised the question of whether the
Canadian Bill of Rights should be applied by the courts as a law capable of
imposing restraints on legislative and administrative action which infringes any
of its guarantees. There are a number of reasons which would justify the
exercise of this supervisory role by the court. It is an institution which operates
in a non-partisan atmosphere and is not influenced by majority desires to
override the rights of the minority. Its decisions are based on who has the
best arguments not who has the most votes. The court is an arena in which
one individual can effectively seek redress of his grievances. And because the
court considers the issues within the context of a factual situation rather than
in the abstract, it is better able to assess the meaning of the fundamental rights
and freedoms. Finally, the primary concern of the legislature is the deter-
mination and implementation of policy. In the performance of this function,
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it may only consider peripherally the effect of its legislation on basic rights and
freedoms. By judicially reviewing legislative and administrative action for
Bill of Rights purposes, the courts provide a more detailed, non-legislative
second look.
If the above discussion makes the case for the judicial protection of civil
liberties in general, when one considers the performance of our courts to date,
can the same case be made for judicial protection of civil liberties in Canada?

